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Abstract—In stochastic differential game, one of the core targets is to find and calculate Nash equilibrium. Due to
the non-polynomial time dilemma, it is not trivial to calculate Nash equilibrium in an efficient way. In this paper,
we approximate Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equation to find Nash equilibrium numerically in a time-
discrete way based on a learning process space(strategy) called deep fictitious play. The stochastic optimal control model
is based on Linear-Quadratic model. Under appropriate assumption of strong and weak convergence rate of FBSDE,
we estimate error of cost function. Meanwhile, we approximate the upper-bound of time interval and lower-bound of
iteration stage so as to provide available parameter.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Stochastic differential game usually solves the problem that
multi-player involves in terms of conflict or cooperation. Each
player takes an action or control in order to either obtain more
utilities or, in some cases, pay less cost. In such games, we find
an equilibrium that every player can fetch their own target.
Precisely speaking, such actions/controls make each player
obtain the maximum utility, meanwhile, none of them could
obtain more when they only change their own action/control.
In stochastic differential game, one of the core targets is to
find Nash equilibrium. When we consider Nash Equilibrium,
most of cases we usually find Nash equilibrium with open-loop
(t,X0,W[0,t]) combining with Forward-Backward Stochastic
Differential Equation (FBSDE for short) [1], [2]. In this paper,
we approximate time discretization model Forward-Backward
SDE process in strong convergence and find Nash equilibrium
based on a learning process (strategy) called deep fictitious
play, which is a case that after some arbitrary initial moves at
the first stage, the players choose their best responses against
the empirical strategy distribution of others’ moving at each
stage.
Our intention is to consider the discrete version of liner
quadratic game model. Approximation errors might lead to
the result that the final strategy cannot form an open loop
Nash Equilibrium. However, this paper shows that there is a
relationship between time step parameter and error such that
we can get a level of time discretization. At this level, the
error can be ignored and finally the Nash equilibrium exists.
At the end, we suggest the upper-bound of time interval
and lower-bound of iteration stage so as to provide available
parameters in the future work.
II. PRELIMINARRY
A. Forward-Backward SDE
We consider the following FBSDEs [3],
dxt = b(t, xt, yt, zt)dt+ σ(t, xt, yt, zt)dWt,
−dyt = f(t, xt, yt, zt)dt− ztdWt,
x0 = a, yT = g(xT ),
where
b : Ω× [0, T ]× Rd × Rd × Rd×m → Rd,
σ : Ω× [0, T ]× Rd × Rd × Rd×m → Rd×m,
f : Ω× [0, T ]× Rd × Rd × Rd×m → Rd,
g : Ω× Rd → Rd.










where Gσ = (Gσ1 · · ·Gσd). We use the usual inner product
and Euclidean norm in Rn,Rm, and Rm×d.
Definition 2.2.1.(Definition 2.1 from [3]) A triple of
process (X,Y, Z) : Ω × [0, T ] → Rd × Rd × Rd×m
is called an adapted solution of FBSDE(2.1) if




(i) A(t, u) is uniformly Lipschitz with respect to u;
(ii) for each u, A(·, u) is in M2(0,T);
(iii) g(x) is uniformly Lipschitz w.s.t x ∈ Rd;
(iv) for each x, g(x) is in L2.
The following monotone conditions are our main assump-
tions:
⟨A(t, u)−A(t, u), u− u⟩ ≤ −β1 |Gx̂|2 − β2
∣∣GT ŷ∣∣2 ,
⟨g(x)− g(x), G(x− x)⟩ ≤ 0,
∀u = (x, y, z), u = (x, y, z),
x̂ = x− x, ŷ = y − y, ẑ = z − z,
where β1 and β2 are given non-negative constants with
β1 + β2 > 0.
We then list some famous result from [3], [4]:
Theorem 2.2.1.(Theorem 2.2 from [3]) Assume the above
assumption. Then FBSDE has at most one adapted solution.
Theorem 2.2.2.(Theorem 2.3 from [3]) Assume the above
and yT = ξ, ξ ∈ L2. Then there exists a unique triple
us = (xs, ys, zs), s ∈ [0, T ] satisfying FBSDE.
Theorem 2.2.3.(Theorem 8.2.1 from [4]) Assume the follow-
ing conditions.
(1) F = FW
(2) g(0) ∈ L2, b0 ∈ L1,2(F,Rd1), f0 ∈ L1,2(F,Rd2), σ0 ∈
L2(F,Rd1×d), where ξ0 := ξ(0, 0, 0) for ξ = b, σ, f

















c0 := ∥∂σz∥∞∥∂gx∥∞ < 1.
where ∥∂σz∥∞ and ∥∂gx∥∞ denote the Lipschitz constants of
σ in z and that of g in x, respectively.
Then there exist δ0 > 0 and C, which depend only on the
Lipschitz constants in the assumption above, and the above
constant c0, such that whatever T ≤ δ0, FBSDE admits a
unique solution Θ and it holds












and we can use ∥Θ∥2 := ∥X,Y, Z∥2, as the solution.
B. Deep learning algorithms
In Hu’s paper [5], she provides numerical algorithm for
stochastic game with deep fictitious play. We ignore the
algorithm figure since the absence of simulation part.
C. Approximation of stochastic process
1) Euler-Maruyama method: To know the Euler-Maruyama
method, we now consider a simple SDE:
dXt = a(Xt)dt+ b(Xt)dBt
with initial condition X0 = x0, where Bt follows Wiener pro-
cess and the time interval is [0, T ]. Then the Euler-Maruyama
method to the solution X is a Markov chain Y defined as
follow:
Partition the time T into N interval with 0 < t1 < t2 <
... < tN = T and h = TN and set tk = hk.
Set Y0 = x0 and Yn+1 = Yn+a(Yn)h+ b(Yn)∆Wt, where
0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1 and ∆Wt =Wtn+1 −Wtn .
Then we can apply this structure equipped with weak error
and strong error [6] to L-Q model.
For the mathematical model, partitioning [0, T ] into NT
equally-spaced intervals, with the time step h = TNT . Denote
by F̃ := {F̃k, 0 ≤ k ≤ NT } the filtration of time discrete
version with F̃k = σ{Wjh, 0 ≤ jh ≤ k}.























and each entry X̃ ltk in X̃tk follow Euler-Maruyama method










































), l ∈ I.
For the L-Q model, we consider αn(t, x, y) =
(q + (1 − 1N )Kt)x − (1 −
1
N )y, let (t, x, y) satisfies
the triple (t, X̃i,nt , ψ
i,n
t ), then α
i,n
t = α
i,n(t, X̃i,nt , ψ
i,n
t ) as






2) Approximation of FBSDE: Here we lists some famous
result about Forward and Backward SDE from [4] based on
time discrete version.
Theorem 2.4.1.(Theorem 5.3.1 from [4]) Let Assumption
below holds, and fix 0 ≤ t ≤ T :
(1) b, σ, f , g are deterministic. b(·, 0), σ(·, 0), f(·, 0, 0, 0)
and g(0) are bounded.
(2) b, σ, f , g are uniformly Lipschitz continuous in















(3) b, σ, f , g are uniformly Hölder-12 continuous in t








|Xt − X̂htk |
2
]
≤ C[1 + |x0|2]h.











Theorem 5.3.3.(Theorem 8.2.1 from [4]) Let assumption
















|Zt − Ẑhtk |
2dt
]
≤ C[1 + |x0|2]h,
where













Ŷ htk+1 := Etk
[
Ŷ htk+1 + f(tk, X̂
h
tk

















≈ Ŷ htk+1 + f(tk, X̂
h
tk





A. Problem setting for error analysis
Given a probability space (Ω,F ,P), we use the following
notations:
W = [W 0,W 1, ...,WN ] is a (N + 1)-vector of m-
dimensional independent Brownian motions.
F = {Ft, 0 ≤ t ≤ T} is the augmented filtration generated
by W.
In this case, we follow the L-Q model proposed in [7], where
player’s dynamics system looks like:
dXit = [a(Xt −Xit) + αit]dt+ σ(ρdW 0t +
√








At this moment, {W it , 0 ≤ i ≤ N} are independent standard
Brownian motions. Each player i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} controls the
drift part by using αit in order to minimize the cost function
J i(α1, ..., αN ) = E
[∫ T
0
f i(Xt, αit)dt+ gi(XT )
]
,
where the running cost and terminal cost in this case follow:














In time-continuous version, we are focusing the fictitious
play as well as their algorithm, that means the players start
with a initial belief of their opponents’ actions α0. At stage
n+1, the players have observed the same past controls αi,n’s
and individually each player optimizes the their each control
problem, at the same time, others will follow their choice at
state n, we follow the result by [5],





t ) + α
i
t]dt
+ σ(ρdW 0t +
√





t ) + α
j,n
t ]dt
+ σ(ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2dW jt ).




































Then in the open-loop equilibria, the minimizer of the





for L-Q model case:
















)2K2t −(ϵ−q2), KT = c,













































where γt is a deterministic function on [0, T ]:
γt = a+ (1−
1
N
)q + (1− 1
N
)2Kt.
We found it is solvable and the Riccati equation has the
solution and can be calculated. Finally we can find the Nash
equilibrium using deep fictitious play.
However, if we consider other dynamic system or we
consider the cost function within semi-linear even the general
case, it will be so hard to calculate. The existence of FBSDE
might not be confirmed, which trigger us to consider the other
way, that is , time discrete version.
Our target is to consider the distance between continuous
cost function. Then we want to check if the error can be small





, α̂i,n,htk , ψ̂
i,n,h
tk
, ϕ̂i,j,ntk be approximated processes







Before the proof, we list some assumptions that highly
related to the following part.
(H1): Assume our FBSDE preocess above (3.1) has well-
posedness.
(H2): The estimation of inequality of the weak/strong
convergence theorem is applied to α, X̃ independently






2 − (αi,nt )2] ≤ Chp1 are in-
dependent with n, same for X̃t, ψt, ϕt.















2]| ≤ Chp1 .

































≤ C[1 + |x0|2]hp2 ,
where C and p2 are positive.
(H5): Assume 0 < B1 < 1, 0 < d < 1, 0 < C2 < 1,
0 < C6 < 1, where B1, d, C2, C6 will be defined behind the
proof of theorem 3.2.1.
(H6): ∀ t, tk in [0, T ], Assume E[(X̃i,nt )2] ≤ C[1 + |x0|2],
E[(ψi,nt )





)2] ≤ C[1 + |x0|2]
where C is independent of t, n, i, h.
(H7): Assume that ∀i, n, h, k, ˆ̃X
i,n,h
tk




are Ftk -measurable and in L2.
Here are the main result:
Theorem 3.2.1. Assuming the appropriate parameter in the
formula above, then
|J i,n,h − J i|




2 + C2(T,N)(B1 ∨ d)n−1,
where define p = (2p1) ∧ p2 and C1(T,N, σ), C2(T,N) are
kind of constants. And for ∀ϵ1, ϵ2 > 0, choose the upper bound
of h








and the lower bound of stage n
n > 1 +
log ϵ2 − logC2
log (B1 ∨ d)
.
Then we say
|J i,n,h − J i,n| ≤ ϵ1,
|J i,n − J i| ≤ ϵ2,
|J i,n,h − J i| ≤ |J i,n,h − J i,n|+ |J i,n − J i| ≤ ϵ1 + ϵ2,
which means J i,n,h converges to J i.
The outline proof is given in Appendix.
Proposition 3.2.1. If we consider T , c, q are positive small




(1) 0 < B1 < 1 holds.
(2) 0 < d < 1 holds.
(3) 0 < C2 < 1 holds.
(4) 0 < C6 < 1 holds.
V. DISCUSSION
In this master thesis, our approximation is based on the
time-discrete version instead of time-continuous version. For
the time-continuous FBSDEs, there are a part of method to
figure out, e.g. Four Step Scheme etc., However, for the
discrete time, there is less paper to try especially the stochastic
coefficient FBSDEs. This paper is a good starting point toward
this target.
In this paper, I followed the policy called fictitious play,
which, honestly speaking, is not quite same to the original one.
In fact, fictitious play means the information of stage n will
based on the average of the past. We can deem the average as a
special weighted average, so as the case that the stage n based
on the last stage n−1. In the future, we can break this rule with
slightly different information weighted. For example, now we
assumed each player received different weighted information
instead of every one received same information. Such ideas
are not worthless to discuss.
Due to the time-limit, my thesis cannot do some simula-
tions based on the deep fictitious play. However, using deep
learning algorithm instead of traditional solvable FBSDEs is
challenging topic and honestly speaking only small part of
top university researchers are trying to climb this mountain.
Now I have no such environment and background to figure
out clearly, still under-consideration.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this master thesis, time discretization is considered to
approximate stochastic game and error analysis is also cal-
culated, which is our main research. In the previous paper,
continuous time version for the Linear-quadratic stochastic
game was proved and Nash equilibrium is available for the
L-Q model. Now we suggest in time discretization version, we
still can find the strong convergence based on our assumption.
At the final part, we take the limit on n, which means the
stage of its deep fictitious algorithms goes to infinity, the
distance goes to zero.
|J i,n,h − J i| ≤ |J i,n,h − J i,n|+ |J i,n − J i| → 0.
Here, we assumed that the infinity stage forms Nash equi-
librium, which followed the previous work by [5]. Then the
result means, the error goes to zero in L2 sense, which we
can say the time discrete L-Q stochastic game converge to
its time continuous model. Meanwhile, we suggest under our










And when we consider the deep learning algorithm based
iteration stage n, it is better bigger than
1 +
log ϵ2 − logC2
log (B1 ∨ d)
.
Finally we found some of our assumptions can be obtained
if we take appropriate value on each parameter:




then parameter of assumption on (H5) holds.
VII. APPENDIX
We briefly introduce the outline of the proof in terms of
Theorem 3.2.1, the full version please check paper.
Proof. In the following, we sometimes ignore index time t,
player number i. Set tk = ⌊t/h⌋h, where ⌊·⌋ is the Gaussian
symbol.



















)2 − (X̃nt )2]}dt
∣∣∣∣.
(2)













)2 − (X̃nt )2]| ≤
1
2
C[1 + |x0|2]hp2 .







≤ q[C(1 + |x0|2)hp2 ]1/2[2C21′E(X̃nt )2








[2C21′C[1 + |x0|2]hp2 + 2(1− 1N )
2C[1 + |x0|2]hp2 ]1/2,
where we apply Hölder inequality, Theorem 2.2.3 C1 ≡ q +







)2 = C[1 + |x0|2]hp2 ,
E(X̃nt )
2 ≤ C[1 + |x0|2],
E(ψnt )
2 ≤ C[1 + |x0|2],
E(ψnt − ψntk)






)2 ≤ C[1 + |x0|2].
Second we consider





























∣∣∣∣ Bn−111−B1 (maxi ∥∆αi,0∥22) 12
∣∣∣∣ ,
where C7 can be deemed as (1 − 1N )
2
(























∥αkt ∥22, we consider estimation of the follow-






















dW it − dW it ),
























where γ = a + (1 − 1N )q + (1 −
1
N )










modified by [5]. K is Riccati equation in the section 3.1 above
and 1




t , C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, d
′
replace the corresponding term properly for simplicity.



































2. We now estimate ∥X̃i,n+1∥2, ∥X̃i,n − X̃i∥2.


























































where G1 = 1−e
−2Tγ
2γ × (1 −
1
N )
2 × (2 + (1 − 1N )).
G1C7(
1−e−2Tγ






















Then we can say∣∣∣∣∣E
∫ T
0









































































At the end, we summarise the result from (3) to (5) and
(1)’s result, we found
|J i,n,h − J i| ≤ |J i,n,h − J i,n|+ |J i,n − J i|



















n > 1 +
log ϵ2 − logC2
log (B1 ∨ d)
.
If we have approximation with time discretization error with
order hp, then we need the upper bound of h and the lower
bound of iteration stage n showing above. We can say when
n→ ∞, which means k → ∞ and h→ 0, we found
|J i,n,h − J i| ≤ |J i,n,h − J i,n|+ |J i,n − J i| → 0
where we can set appropriate parameter ϵ, c, T,K, q, a, σ, such
that 0 ≤ B1 < 1, 0 ≤ d < 1, all of parameter C∗ are constant.
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